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In Defense of Defensive Devices:
How Delaware Discouraged Preventive Measures in
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare
Andrew D. Arons*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a company facing bankruptcy and foreseeing no hope of
maintaining the current state of its business. As a final effort to save
some vestiges of the company, it seeks out another company with
which to merge in order to maintain the business in conjunction with
another company. Two possibilities arise out of a year-and-a-half long
search. First, one company offers a merger, but only by means of an
asset sale through bankruptcy court at a price substantially lower than
the face value of the company's debt. Second, the other company for-
tunately offers terms that preserves the corporation, provide relief to
creditors, and satisfy the shareholders, albeit with a condition. This
second company will only accept terms providing the only basis for
preserving the legitimate goals of the target company and satisfying
the target's members if the target company agrees to several provi-
sions which will prevent any other company from usurping the acquir-
ing company's place. Now imagine that the Delaware Supreme Court
has eliminated hope for this second, more beneficial option. Unfortu-
nately, imagination has become reality due to a recent split decision in
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc.'
This note discusses the Delaware Supreme Court's recent split deci-
sion to invalidate a merger agreement due to deal protection devices
agreed to by NCS Healthcare (NCS) and Genesis Health Ventures,
Inc (Genesis). 2 Part II of this note discusses merger agreements, the
factual background of Omnicare, and the majority's arguments. Part
III discusses how the majority came to an incorrect holding. Finally,
part IV suggests possible effects the majority's decision will have on
future merger transactions.
* DePaul University College of Law, J.D., expected May 2005; University of Illinois-Urbana/
Champaign, B.A., 2002.
1. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) (3-2 decision).
2. Id. at 918 ("We have concluded that, in the absence of an effective fiduciary out clause,
those defensive measures are both preclusive and coercive").
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II. BACKGROUND
a. Mergers in General
A merger is a transaction which may occur under state corporation
law where at least two corporations combine, causing only one corpo-
ration to maintain its identity, while the other ceases to exist in sepa-
rate form.3 Mergers are creatures of state corporate law, and
therefore the rules governing a particular merger may vary somewhat
between jurisdictions depending on the individual corporate statutes
and local judicial interpretation. A merger is distinguishable from an
acquisition, in that an acquisition may not always be at the assent of
both corporations, while a merger is often characterized by a mutual
interest in combining the corporate entities. 4 In a merger, the remain-
ing corporation is called the acquirer, and the corporation that loses
its identity is called the target corporation. There are numerous rea-
sons why a target corporation would seek its own sale, including busi-
ness development, need for financing, liquidation of assets, and as a
means to block a takeover bid.5
Mergers usually involve several steps. First, the acquiring and tar-
get corporate managements reach a preliminary agreement and issue
a press release according to securities laws to prevent unfair advan-
tage to insiders based on their knowledge. 6 The boards then adopt a
merger agreement and notify their shareholders accordingly. 7 Some-
times the boards may incorporate protective devices into the merger
agreement to mitigate the risks due to unanticipated events. For in-
stance, 'lockups' add contractual provisions to prevent the deal from
falling through by prohibiting the seller from entertaining bids from
other prospective purchasers." Depending on the circumstances and
the jurisdiction of the corporations, a majority of shareholders must
then accept the merger agreement. Consideration for the merger pro-
vided to the target corporation may come in the form of securities in
the acquiring corporation, debt, cash, or some combination thereof.9
Generally, dissenting shareholders have an appraisal remedy in which
they have the right to demand that the corporation purchase their
shares for fair price, which may be based on the market price or a
3. Mathew Bender, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers §1.01(1) (LexisNexis 2003).
4. Id.
5. Id. at §1.01(4).
6. Id. at §2.02(1).
7. Bender, supra note 3, at §2.02(1).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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judicial appraisal of the value of the shares. 10 To complete the
merger, the surviving corporation files articles of merger with the state
of incorporation and succeeds to the target's assets and liabilities
based on the merger agreement."
b. The Circumstances of the Merger in OMNICARE v. NCS
i. NCS' Search for an Acquirer
In 1999, NCS, a leading provider of pharmacy services to long-term
care institutions, experienced difficulties in collecting accounts receiv-
ables due in part to adverse market conditions in the health care in-
dustry.12 These financial troubles led to NCS's stock price dropping
from twenty dollars per share to five dollars per share within one
year.13 Soon after, in 2001, NCS defaulted on roughly $350 million in
debt dropping its price per share of Class A common stock to under
fifty cents a share. 14 Prior to the default, NCS retained UBS Warburg,
L.L.C. in February 2000 to find investors or acquirers. 15 After receiv-
ing only one unsatisfactory offer, NCS switched its financial advising
from UBS Warburg, L.L.C. to Brown, Gibbons, Long & Company in
December 2000.16 In 2001, when NCS's financial condition deterio-
rated and the company received formal notice of default and accelera-
tion from the Noteholders' trustee, the Noteholders formed an 'Ad
Hoc Committee' to represent their financial interests.17 NCS dis-
cussed several offers to restructure the company through bankruptcy,
but found that the offers did not provide sufficient consideration for
its shareholders. 18
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 918, 920. (In 1999, the market conditions in the healthcare industry
were adversely affected when the government and third-party providers changed the timing and
level of reimbursements. Id. at 920. See Nathalie D. Martin & Elizabeth Rourke, Les Jeux Ne
Sont Pas Faits: The Right to Dignified Long-Term Care in the Face of Industry-Wide Financial
Failure, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129 (2000), for more information regarding the changes
in the healthcare industry due to the Prospective Payment System mandated in the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 and amended by the Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999.
13. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 920.
14. Id. (stating that NCS common stock traded in a range of nine cents to fifty cents per share
until days before the announcement of the transaction at issue).
15. Id. at 921.
16. Id. at 920-921. (The Noteholders held approximately $350 million of NCS debt instru-
ments which included senior bank debt of $206 million and convertible subordinated debentures
of $102 million.)
17. Id. at 921.
18. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921.
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Finally, in 2001, NCS contacted Omnicare, another Delaware com-
pany in the institutional pharmacy business, 19 to discuss a possible
transaction, to which Omnicare sent a proposal to acquire NCS in a
bankruptcy sale under §363 of the Bankruptcy Code for $225 million
subject to completion of due diligence. 20 Omnicare raised its bid to
$270 million in August, which still left NCS with $80 million of out-
standing debt, and thus would not provide full recovery to the Note-
holders, and would provide no recovery to NCS's shareholders. 21
Meanwhile, Omnicare targeted NCS's customers in attempts to entice
them to switch suppliers. 22 Despite October negotiations, Omnicare
held fast to its requirement that the merger only occur through an
asset sale. Secretly, the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders negoti-
ated with Omnicare and announced an offer in February 2002 for an-
other asset sale in bankruptcy for more than $313 million.23
One month earlier, in January 2002, the Ad Hoc Committee con-
tacted Genesis, a "leading provider of healthcare and support services
to the elderly" 24 which recently emerged from a bankruptcy of its
own. 25 Simultaneously, NCS began to improve, prompting the direc-
tors to believe that its Noteholders and shareholders could benefit
from a more advantageous merger deal than those currently on the
table. To seek out such a deal and ensure the proper fiduciary duties
were provided to the corporation as a whole, NCS formed the Inde-
pendent Committee made up of neither NCS employees nor major
shareholders in March 2002.26 While the board granted the Indepen-
dent Committee the power to negotiate possible merger transactions,
19. Id. at 918.
20. Id. at 921 (Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee or debtor in bankruptcy
to sell or lease assets of the entity upon sufficient notice to creditors and the bankruptcy court.
11 USC 363(b), (c). Obviously, sales through bankruptcy also require consideration of the bank-
ruptcy laws that are not directly at issue in this note).
21. Id.
22. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921 n3. (These actions to entice NCS's customers away occurred
several times and were revealed during discovery.)
23. Id. at 921. (stating that the offer was for $313,740,000).
24. Id. at 919.
25. Id. at 921.
26. Id. at 922. (In contrast to the Independent Committee, the NCS board of directors con-
sisted of four members, two of which, Jon H. Outcalt and Kevin B. Shaw, at the time of the
dispute collectively owned 230,988 shares of Class A stock and 4,617,220 shares of Class B stock
constituting more than sixty-five percent of the voting power of NCS stock. Id. at 918-920. Ad-
ditionally, Outcalt and Shaw's holdings encompassed substantially all of the outstanding shares
of the Class B stock. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc, 825 A.2d 264, 266 (Del. Ch. 2002),
rev'd, 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).)
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the full NCS board retained approval powers and shared its legal and
financial counsel with the Independent Committee. 27
ii. Genesis and NCS Proposed Merger Terms
Based in part on its previous loss of a bidding war to Omnicare,
Genesis did not want to simply negotiate as a stalking horse, which
would "only result in [their] valuation... being publicly disclosed, and
thereby creating an environment where Omnicare felt to maintain its
competitive monopolistic positions, that they had to match and exceed
that level."' 28 Genesis negotiated a transaction outside of bankruptcy
with favorable terms for NCS. In June, Genesis proposed a "repay-
ment of the NCS senior debt in full, full assumption of trade credit
obligations, an exchange offer or direct purchase of the NCS Notes
providing NCS Noteholders with a combination of cash and Genesis
common stock. . ., and $20 million in value for the NCS common
stock. '29 Several days later Genesis agreed to increase its offer and
suggested $24 million in consideration for the NCS common stock in
the form of Genesis common stock.30 Most importantly for the litiga-
tion leading to this case, the proposed transactions also included sev-
eral clauses intended to provide Genesis with a degree of certainty
that the parties would consummate their negotiated transaction. 31
Genesis absolutely refused to continue to work towards closing the
agreement unless NCS agreed to act on an exclusive basis with Gene-
sis.32 NCS's legal counsel first examined Genesis's proposed exclusiv-
ity agreement, and the Independent Committee met shortly
afterwards in July to consider it as well.33 During the Independent
Committee meeting, a summary of Genesis' new and improved terms
were presented which would repay the NCS senior debt in full, pay
the notes' par value with a combination of cash and Genesis stock, pay
the NCS shareholders $24 million of Genesis stock, and would assume
the additional liabilities to trade and other unsecured creditors. 34 The
Independent Committee was told that Genesis required the Exclusiv-
27. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 922.
28. Id. at 922 (quoting a Genesis advisor's testimony stating that Genesis wanted a degree of
certainty that if it was willing to pursue a negotiated merger agreement, Genesis would be able
to consummate that transaction).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 923.
31. Id.
32. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 923.
33. Id.
34. Id. (The assumption of liabilities is available due to the structure of the transaction as a
merger, versus an asset sale through bankruptcy).
2004]
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ity Agreement in order to help secure a completely locked up transac-
tion preventing NCS from accepting a higher Omnicare bid.35 The
Committee was also told that Genesis had previously suffered in other
acquisition negotiations due to Omnicare outbidding them at the last
minute, and therefore wanted a "bulletproof deal or they were not
going to go forward. ' 36 Thereafter, NCS executed the exclusivity
agreement and Genesis provided draft agreements for the merger,
Noteholders' support agreement, and voting agreements for two NCS
shareholders who held a majority of the voting power of NCS com-
mon stock.37 These Voting Agreements, entered into between Gene-
sis and the two majority shareholders, Outcalt and Shaw, would
become a main point of contention in the Omnicare litigation.38 Dur-
ing the negotiations that followed over the next several weeks the In-
dependent Committee and Ad Hoc Committee again successfully
encouraged better terms from Genesis. 39
Omnicare then renewed its interest in NCS and based on the in-
creasing price of NCS stock, surmised that NCS was negotiating a deal
that most likely included payment for its stock, and for the first time
submitted a proposal that did not involve a sale of assets in bank-
ruptcy.40 The offer suggested retiring NCS's senior and subordinated
debt at par value plus accrued interest, in addition to providing the
shareholders three dollars in cash for their shares. Furthermore, the
offer was conditioned upon negotiating a merger agreement, ob-
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 923.
38. (The voting agreements stated:
The Stockholder hereby irrevocably and unconditionally agrees to vote or to cause to
be voted all of the Shares then owned of record or beneficially by him at the Company
Stockholders Meeting and at any other annual or special meeting of shareholders of the
Company where any such proposal is submitted, and in connection with any written
consent of stockholders, (A) in favor of the [Merger] and (B) against (i) approval of
any proposal made in opposition to or in competition with the [Merger] and the trans-
actions contemplated by the Merger Agreement, (ii) any merger. consolidation, sale of
assets, business combination, share exchange, reorganization or recapitalization of the
Company or any of its subsidiaries, with or involving any party other than as contem-
plated by the Merger Agreement, (iii) any liquidation or winding up of the Company,
(iv) any extraordinary dividend by the company, (v) any change in the capital structure
of the Company (other than pursuant to the Merger Agreement) and (vi) any other
action that may reasonably be expected to impede, interfere with, delay, postpone or
attempt to discourage the consummation of the transactions contemplated by the
Merger Agreement.)
Omnicare, 825 A.2d at 264, 268 (Del. Ch. 2002), rev'd, 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
39. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 923.
40. Id. at 924.
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taining third party consents, and completing due diligence. 41 A mem-
ber of the Ad Hoc Committee responded to these attractive economic
terms and unsuccessfully tried to convince Omnicare to drop the due
diligence condition.4 2 NCS was unable to respond to the offer due to
the Genesis exclusivity agreement that "precluded NCS from 'engag-
ing or participating in any discussions or negotiations with respect to a
Competing Transaction or a proposal for one.' ,,43 Nevertheless, the
Independent Committee met to discuss a response and determined
that further negotiations with Omnicare would present "an unaccept-
able risk that Genesis would abandon merger discussions. ' 44 The
Committee based this decision on Omnicare's past proposals through
bankruptcy and refusal to consider a merger.45 The Committee also
relied on the fact that Omnicare only negotiated with the Notehold-
ers' representatives in the Ad Hoc Committee instead of the NCS rep-
resentatives. Therefore, the Committee felt that the risk of losing the
Genesis proposal was too substantial.46
After Genesis improved its terms in response to the Omnicare of-
fer, the Independent Committee and NCS board of directors ap-
proved the merger agreement. The new terms would retire the Notes
by the terms of the indenture, including, for the first time, payment of
all accrued interest and a redemption premium; an eighty percent in-
crease in the exchange ratio for NCS common stock to a one to ten
ratio; and a four million dollar decrease in the termination fee to six
million dollars. 47 However, these terms were only valid if NCS ap-
proved the transaction by midnight of the following day, otherwise
Genesis would end discussions and withdraw its offer.48 In addition,
the merger agreement allowed NCS stockholders to exercise their ap-
praisal rights, required NCS to submit the merger agreement to NCS
shareholders even if the board changed its recommendation for the
merger, and prevented NCS from discussing alternative acquisition of
NCS with third parties unless the alternative offer was an unsolicited
written proposal with specific terms the board believed to be superior,
and the third party would execute a confidentiality agreement compa-
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 924.
45. Id. (noting that Omnicare would be considered a "competing transaction).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 924-925.
48. Id. at 925.
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rable to Genesis. 49 Moreover, two shareholders, Outcalt and Shaw,
who held the majority of the voting power of NCS stock, were re-
quired to enter into voting agreements with Genesis in which the two
shareholders voting in their shareholder capacity would irrevocably
vote all of their shares in favor of the agreement.50
iii. The Basis of NCS' Approval of Genesis' Required
Merger Terms
While determining whether to approve the merger agreement, the
Independent Committee met first and based on full information of all
material facts and the Committee's feeling that Genesis was serious
about the deadline, voted unanimously in recommending the merger
to the board.51 The board then convened and concluded that the risk
of the possible loss of the Genesis deal in conjunction with the uncer-
tainty of Omnicare's latest offer weighed in Genesis' favor, and the
board approved the Genesis transaction.5 2 At this point, the board
authorized the majority shareholder voting agreements which locked
up those shareholders' votes in favor of the merger. The board was
informed by its legal counsel at this time that the voting agreements
guaranteed shareholder approval of the merger even if the board
changed or withdrew its recommendation, thus, "preventing NCS from
engaging in any alternative or superior transaction in the future. '53
Within hours of the execution of the merger agreement, Omnicare
faxed a proposal to NCS with a draft merger agreement attached and
later announced a tender offer for NCS's shares at $3.50 a share.54
The Independent Committee, the full board of directors, and their le-
gal and financial advisers all found that Omnicare's interest would not
lead to a 'superior proposal' as defined by the Genesis Merger agree-
49. Id. at 925-926 (Two of these requirements were somewhat redundant under Delaware
corporate law, which governed this transaction, since they are required in all mergers. Appraisal
rights, which provide shareholders with a fair value for their shares determined by the market or
the court, are always available to minority shareholders who do not wish to participate in the
merger. 8 Del. C. §262. Additionally, § 281 of the Delaware corporate statute requires submis-
sion of merger agreements to the shareholders for a vote regardless of the board's recommenda-
tion one way or another. 8 Del. C. §281. Statutory sections such as these are common in
corporate statutes with regards to a merger, since a merger, or termination of the corporate
entity, is one of the most significant actions that can occur within a corporation).
50. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 926. (Outcalt and Shaw held more than 65% of the voting power
of NCS stock. It is important to note the voting agreement specifically stated that these two
shareholders, who also held the positions of Chairman of the Board, President, CEO, and direc-
tor were acting in their capacity as shareholders.)
51. Id. at 925.
52. Id.
53. Id. (emphasis in original).
54. Id. at 926.
[Vol. 3:105
DEFENSIVE DEVICES
ment exclusivity provision governing discussions of alternative offers,
but NCS did receive a waiver from Genesis allowing them to discuss
Omnicare's offer with Omnicare. 55 Omnicare irrevocably committed
itself to a transaction and agreed to acquire all outstanding NCS
shares at its tender offer price causing the NCS board to withdraw its
recommendation that the shareholders vote for the Genesis merger;
NCS's financial advisor also withdrew its fairness opinion of the Gen-
esis merger. 56 Even while the board withdrew its recommendation, it
admitted in a SEC filing that it recognized the Genesis merger agree-
ment prevented NCS from accepting the merger proposal and the vot-
ing agreements guaranteed NCS shareholder approval of the Genesis
merger.57 NCS shareholders and Omnicare then commenced the liti-
gation at issue in Omnicare v. NCS5 8 to prevent the completion of the
Genesis transaction. 59
The case as decided by the Delaware Supreme Court is actually a
consolidated appeal from two separate actions. Omnicare sought to
invalidate the merger agreement on fiduciary duty grounds and chal-
lenged the majority shareholder voting agreements. 60 Several NCS
shareholders also brought an action to invalidate the merger, alleging
the directors breached their fiduciary duty in creating a process that
would not produce the highest value for the shareholders. 61 In the
lower court Omnicare action, the Court of Chancery dismissed Omni-
care's fiduciary duty claims for lack of standing, and held that al-
though Omnicare had standing as a bona fide bidder to convert the
two majority shareholders' Class B stock to Class A stock, NCS's
charter did not in fact require an automatic conversion under these
facts, and dismissed Omnicare's action accordingly.62 The Court of
Chancery also denied a preliminary injunction of the merger sought
55. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 927.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 825 A.2d 264 (Del. Ch. 2002).
59. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003).
60. Id. at 919. (This action was C.A. No. 19800 in the Court of Chancery). Id.
61. Id. (This action was C.A. No. 19786 in the Court of Chancery). Id.
62. Id. at 919-920 (Section 7(d) of NCS's Charter stated:
Any purported transfer of shares of Class B Common Stock other than to a Permitted
Transferee shall automatically, without any further act or deed on the part of the Cor-
poration or any other person, result in the conversion of such shares into shares of
Class A Common Stock on a share-for-share basis, effective on the date of such pur-
ported transfer.
Omnicare, 825 A.2d at 267-268 (Del. Ch. 2002). An automatic conversion of the two sharehold-
ers' shares from Class A to Class B would decrease these shareholders' votes per share by a
factor of ten, a difference of about forty-one million votes, since they had a combined total of
more than 4.6 million shares of Class B stock. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 919-920 (Del. 2003).)
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by the NCS shareholders. 63 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed in
a split decision, specifically reversing the denial of the preliminary in-
junction and breach of fiduciary duty claims.64 The Chief Justice and
Justice Steele also wrote two dissenting opinions, which criticized the
majority's holding and analysis.65
c. The Decision in Omnicare v. NCS
i. Two Primary Cases in the Majority's Analysis
In upholding the causes of action against Omnicare, the majority
relied heavily upon Delaware's requirements for enhanced judicial
scrutiny of board transactions as described in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.66 and Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.67 In
Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a stock repurchase plan
intended as a defensive device against a tender offer.68 Mesa Petro-
leum Company owned about 13% of Unocal's stock and began a two-
tier cash tender offer for about 37% of Unocal's outstanding stock.69
In response, Unocal's board, which included a majority of eight
outside directors, rejected Mesa's tender offer as inadequate. 70 The
board decided that if Mesa acquired a set amount of Unocal stock,
Unocal would buy the remaining 49% of outstanding stock. 71
The Unocal court focused much of its attention on whether the bus-
iness judgment rule was applicable to the management repurchase
plan in response to the two-tiered cash tender offer.72 The court first
noted that an enhanced duty calling for judicial examination may arise
before the protections of business judgment rule are applied due to
"the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its sharehold-
63. Id. at 920.
64. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 939.
65. Id. at 939, 946.
66. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
67. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
68. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
69. Id. at 949.
70. Id. at 950-951
71. Id.
72. Id. at 953. (The business judgment rule presumes that directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that when they made a business deci-
sion, the action was in the best interests of the company. Id. at 954 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Where the business judgment rule applies, "a court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter's decision can be 'attributed to any
rational business purpose."' Id. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,720 (Del.
1971). Thus, a court adopts a deferential approach to business decisions governed by the busi-
ness judgment rule.)
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ers. ' '73 When a director conflict of interest arises, "directors must
show they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to cor-
porate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's
stock ownership" and can satisfy that burden "by showing good faith
and reasonable investigation. '74 Satisfaction of this burden is "mate-
rially enhanced by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of
outside independent directors who have acted in accordance with the
foregoing standards. '7 5
The court held that directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best
interests of the corporation's shareholders and this duty extends to
protect the corporation and its owners from perceived harm, but the
corporation may not use "any Draconian means available.
'76 This
standard of proof is designed to ensure that a defensive measure to
impede a takeover is motivated by a good faith concern for the corpo-
ration and its shareholders' welfare.7 7 Moreover, for defensive mea-
sures to be evaluated under the business judgment rule, they must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 78 In order to be reasonable
in relation to the threat posed, the directors must analyze the nature
of the takeover bid and the effect on the corporation. 79 For instance,
the board may consider the "inadequacy of the price offered, nature
and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constitu-
encies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees,
and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsum-
mation, and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange.
80
The Unocal court agreed with the Court of Chancery that the direc-
tors exercised their good faith belief in opposing Mesa's tender offer
based on their belief that it was inadequate and coercive.81 Therefore,
Unocal's plan was found "reasonable in relation to the threat the
board rationally and reasonably believed was posed by Mesa's inade-
quate and coercive. . .tender offer," entitling measurement of the
board's action by the business judgment rule.8 2
73. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
74. Id. at 955 (citing and quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 554-555 (Del. 1964).)
75. Id. (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812, 815.)
76. Id. (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).)
77. Id. (citing Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554-555).
78. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
79. Id.
80. Id. (Citing Lipton and Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities:
An Update, p. 7, ABA National Institute on the Dynamics of Corporate Control (December 8,
1983).)
81. Id. at 958.
82. Id.
2004]
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Ten years after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court reexamined
situations in which enhanced judicial scrutiny should apply before em-
ploying the business judgment rule with regard to defensive actions in
Unitrin v. American General.83 In Unitrin, the court considered Uni-
trin's stock repurchase plan in response to American General's public
proposal to acquire Unitrin's stock, and held that the Court of Chan-
cery misapplied the proportionality requirement as set forth in Uno-
cal.84 The Unitrin court lays out the proper enhanced scrutiny
procedure as first determining whether the target company board's
defensive actions were draconian by being either preclusive or coer-
cive, and then if the measures were not draconian, determining
whether the actions were within a range of reasonable responses to
the threat posed by the acquiring corporation. 85 The Unitrin court in-
dicated that three levels of judicial review can apply to a shareholder's
challenge of the directors' actions, "the traditional business judgment
rule, the Unocal standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the entire
fairness standard. '86 Even before Unocal's enhanced judicial scrutiny
applies, a court must first determine whether the conduct at issue was
defensive. 87
In Unitrin, the court agreed with the lower court's finding that the
board's actions were in response to a perceived threat. 88 The court
then noted, "Unocal's standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny is proper
whenever the record reflects that a board of directors took defensive
measures in response to a 'perceived threat to corporate policy and
effectiveness which touches upon issues of control."89 To reap the
deference of the business judgment rule, a board has the burden of
satisfying a reasonableness test by demonstrating it had reasonable
grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness ex-
isted, and then demonstrate that it satisfies a proportionality test by
demonstrating the board's defensive response was reasonable in rela-
83. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1391.
84. Id. at 1366, 1367.
85. Id. at 1367.
86. Id. at 1371. (These three standards are on a spectrum of judicial scrutiny with the businessjudgment rule the most deferential, the entire fairness standard subject to the most scrutiny, and
the Unocal standard somewhere in between. The entire fairness standard applies if the businessjudgment rule is defeated and requires judicial scrutiny of both fair dealing and fair price. Id. at
n7 (quoting Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180,187 (Del. 1988), Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989), 8 Del.C §144(a)(3).)
87. Id. at 1372.
88. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1372. (The court also did not dispute the lower court's finding that
had the "board enacted the repurchase program independent of a takeover proposal, its decision
would be reviewed under the traditional business judgment rule.") Id.
89. Id. at n9 (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992).)
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tion to the threat posed. 90 Additionally, if the board does not satisfy
Unocal, their actions are not automatically invalidated; instead, the
board must then satisfy the entire fairness standard.91
Turning its attention to the proportionality test, the court indicated
that "the threat associated with a particular hostile offer sets the pa-
rameters for the range of permissible defensive tactics," and the board
must have acted in reasonable relation to the threat posed to share-
holder interests. 92 The reasonableness of defensive measures depends
on a "clear identification of the nature of the threat. ' 93 An evaluation
of the board's overall response as well as the justification for each of
the defensive measures and the results they achieve is also important
under the proportionality test, because the board may not use any
draconian means available nor act "solely or primarily out of a desire
to perpetuate themselves in office."'94 A finding of proportionality is
directly correlated to whether defensive measures were draconian be-
cause they were either coercive or preclusive in nature.95 For exam-
ple, coercive circumstances may arise when the board's defensive
measures are "aimed at 'cramming down' on its shareholders," and
preclusive circumstances may arise if the measures take away the
shareholders right to receive tender offers and fundamentally restrict
proxy contests.96 If the defensive measures are not found to be draco-
nian, the proportionality test then focuses on whether the actions were
within the range of reasonableness. 97 If the defensive measures are
not draconian and the actions are within the range of reasonableness,
a court "must not substitute its judgment for the board's." 98 Finally, if
the board satisfies Unocal's enhanced judicial scrutiny such that the
business judgment rule does apply, the plaintiffs must demonstrate
"by a preponderance of the evidence that the directors' decisions were
primarily based on (1) perpetuating themselves in office or (2) some
90. Id. at 1373, (citing Unocal 493 A.2d at 955. Traditionally a board's response to a merger
offer is tested by the business judgment rule "since a statutory prerequisite (8 DeI.C. §251(b)) to
a merger transaction is approval by the Board before a stockholder action." Id. at 1375-1376
(quoting and citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142, 1154
(Del. 1990).))
91. Id. at n18 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).)
92. Id. at 1384 (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del.
1989).)
93. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1384 (quoting Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1154.)
94. Id. at 1387 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.)
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1154-1155; Moran v. Household In'l,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985).)
97. Id. at 1387-88. (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d
34, 45-46 (Del. 1994).)
98. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388.
20041
118 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of
good faith, or (3) being uninformed." 99
ii. The Majority's Argument in Omnicare
The Omnicare court first investigated which circumstances and
methods are subject to Unocal's enhanced judicial scrutiny to deter-
mine whether the NCS board's approval of the defensive devices
could withstand the challenges from Omnicare and the NCS share-
holders. First, the court attempted to deemphasize that Unocal's
holding was based on hostile takeover proposals by citing Moran v.
Household for the proposition that Unocal applies "to the adoption of
a stockholder's rights plan, even in the absence of an immediate
threat." 100 The court also looked at the 'Revlon duties,' which require
enhanced judicial scrutiny when a merger causes a change in corpo-
rate control, but determined that Revlon did not apply.'0 1 Further-
more, "the adoption of structural safety devices alone does not trigger
Revlon. Rather.. .such devices are properly subject to a Unocal analy-
sis.''102 The court stated that in order to determine whether defensive
devices are approved pursuant to the board's fiduciary duty, the court
must first examine (1) any conflicts arising out of the board's interest
in protecting its own merger transaction, (2) the shareholders' statu-
tory right to decide whether or not to approve a merger, and (3) a
board's continuing responsibility to exercise its fiduciary duties after it
has executed the merger agreement. 103 This conflict arises also be-
cause "[d]efensive devices taken to protect a merger agreement exe-
cuted by a board of directors are intended to give that agreement an
advantage over any subsequent transactions that materialize before
the merger is approved by the stockholders and consummated.' ' 0 4
When a merger does not involve a change of control, but the defen-
sive devices in the executed merger agreement are challenged based
99. Id. at 1390. (emphasis in original, quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.)
100. Omnicare v. NCS, 818 A.2d at 928 (citing Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1356 (Del. 1985).) (This is important because most other cases only applied the enhanced scru-
tiny, utilized by the Omnicare Majority, to defensive measures in response to hostile takeovers,
as opposed to measures incorporated into friendly mergers such as in Omnicare. See, e.g., Uno-
cal, 493 A.2d at 949; Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1368-1369; Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.
559A.2d 1261, 1265 (Del. 1988)).
101. Id. at 928-930 (citing Paramount v. QVC, 637 A.2d at 47; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). The Court states that the Court of Chan-
cery's decision to use the business judgment rule instead of Revlon is "not outcome determina-
tive for the purposes of deciding this appeal." Id.)
102. Id. at 930 (quoting Paramount v. Time, 571 A.2d at 1151. (emphasis in original).)
103. Id.
104. Id. at 932.
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on their effect on a subsequent competing merger, the Unocal scrutiny
arises.105
After walking through the applicable tests Delaware courts have
applied for enhanced scrutiny, the court then attempted to apply Uno-
cal and its progeny to the Omnicare facts. The court found that the
stockholder voting agreements were "inextricably intertwined" with
the merger agreement's defensive devices and were therefore actions
by the board.1°6 The court held they were board actions despite the
fact that the two majority shareholders/directors agreed to the voting
agreements in their shareholder capacity. 10 7 Applying the two-step
analysis of Unocal, NCS's directors were required to show that they
acted in good faith after a reasonable investigation in order to estab-
lish they had reasonable grounds for believing a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed, and the danger here was the risk of
losing Genesis's offer without a comparable alternative. 10 8 To satisfy
the second step the directors must "demonstrate that their defensive
response was 'reasonable in relation to the threat posed,"' which in-
volves another two-step analysis requiring proof that the defensive de-
vices were not coercive or preclusive, and then demonstrating the
response was within a range of reasonableness. 10 9 The court then held
that the defensive devices in the instant case were preclusive and coer-
cive, based on a finding that NCS's public shareholders would be
forced to accept the Genesismerger (coercion). 1 0 In addition, the
lack "of an effective fiduciary out clause-made it 'mathematically im-
possible' and 'realistically unattainable' for the Omnicare transaction
or any other proposal to succeed, no matter how superior the propo-
sal"' (preclusion)."' Due to what the court deemed as the preclusive
and coercive nature of the defensive devices, the majority then found
that the devices were not within a reasonable range of responses to
the perceived threat.11 2
Finally, the court focused on the fact that 'an effective fiduciary out
clause' was not included in the merger agreement that would have
allowed NCS to back out of the Genesis merger agreement if a better
deal came along, thus allowing for an exercise of the board's fiduciary
105. Omnicare v. NCS, 818 A.2d at 933-934 (citing Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc.,
559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988).)
106. Id. at 934.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 935, (citing Unocal 493 A.2d at 955).
109. Id. (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955, Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387-1388.)
110. Omnicare v. NCS, 818 A.2d at 935-936.
111. Id. at 936.
112. Id. (citing Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388-1389).
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responsibilities.' 13 This fiduciary out clause was required by the court
because the court felt that the only way the board could represent the
minority shareholders' interests was to maintain the power to termi-
nate the merger agreement. 11 4 The directors had a continuing obliga-
tion to exercise due care after the merger agreement was announced,
and especially because the board agreed to defensive devices in antici-
pation of the probability of a subsequent superior offer, the board
should have negotiated for a fiduciary out clause.115 Therefore, be-
cause the board "combined two otherwise valid actions" as a lockup
without a fiduciary out clause in the Genesis merger agreement, the
court held that NCS did not withstand Unocal's enhanced judicial
scrutiny and reversed the Court of Chancery's holding which denied
injunctive relief to Omnicare."16
III. ANALYSIS
a. Why the Omnicare Majority Decision was Incorrect
The majority of the Delaware Supreme Court incorrectly held that
the NCS board's actions constituted a breach of fiduciary duty be-
cause the actions, in fact, did satisfy Delaware's requirements, and be-
cause the majority misapplied the applicable law. 117 As noted above,
most corporate management decisions are subject only to the business
judgment rule. Courts exercise deference because they have deter-
mined that those who run corporations are in a better position than
the judiciary to properly weigh all potential factors in reaching what
reasonably appears to be the proper decision for the corporation at
the time the directors or officers make a decision. Justice Steele noted
in his dissenting opinion that courts have no business expertise quali-
fying them to substitute their judgment for an independent commit-
tee, for the board's cost benefit analyses, or for the independent
decisions of majority shareholders. 8 Courts may break from this
deferential standard of review when directors act under a conflict of
interest with the corporation or its shareholders,1 19 although no such
conflict existed here. The majority's decision was incorrect because
NCS' board's actions did in fact satisfy Delaware law, the majority
113. Id.
114. Id. at 937.
115. Omnicare v. NCS, 818 A.2d at 938.
116. Id. at 939.
117. See Section IlI(a)(i) for a discussion of the applicable Delaware law.
118. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 948 (Del. 2003) (Justice Steele's
dissenting opinion).
119. Id. at 930.
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misapplied the applicable law, and other jurisdictions lend support
against the majority's holding.
i. The NCS Board's Actions Satisfied Delaware law
Unocal first noted that in the context of a hostile takeover, where
directors utilize corporate funds as defensive devices to ward off a
threat to control, there is an ever-present risk that the directors' deci-
sions are skewed away from the proper interests. 120 Unitrin also sup-
ported the application of enhanced judicial scrutiny when a conflict of
interest due to a potential loss of control occurs.12' However, the
NCS board was not faced with a conflict due to a potential loss of
control. Either Omnicare's or Genesis' merger offer would eliminate
the directors' control over NCS,' 22 although the majority misguidedly
cites Unocal's discussion of conflict of interest due to a loss of control
as support for the argument that NCS faced a conflict of interest. 123
Justice Steele's dissenting opinion observed, "[t]he contract terms
that NCS' board agreed to included no insidious, camouflaged side
deals for the directors or the majority stockholders nor transparent
provisions for entrenchment or control premiums.' 24 Without a con-
cern of a self-interested transaction, the directors, who also held stock,
were left only with a concern for maximizing the value of their shares,
indicating that they had the same vested interest as the shareholders
in approving the merger deal providing the greatest value. This con-
gruence of interests may be evidenced by the fact that when Omni-
care's superior proposal subsequently arose, the NCS board withdrew
its support of the Genesis deal, despite its agreement with Genesis to
go forth with the merger.1 25 Without a conflict of interest, the busi-
ness judgment rule should apply and the court should defer to the
directors in determining which business transaction is best for the cor-
poration. There is a long line of jurisprudence providing that corpo-
rate decision-making devoid of any indication of conflict should be
afforded a high degree of deference. 126 The use in this holding of en-
120. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
121. Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, n9 (Del., 1995).
122. There was no indication in any of the quoted merger agreements that the directors would
keep their control or board positions.
123. Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 930 n27. (The Majority's reference is inappropriate because
it cites Unocal's discussion of the "omnipresent specter" of a conflict of interest in the context of
a "takeover bid" as opposed to the friendly merger offer in the instant action. Unocal, 493 A.2d
at 954.)
124. Id. at 948. (Justice Steele's dissenting opinion)
125. Id. at 927.
126. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d
910, 923 (Del. 2000); Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 284 (Del. 2003).
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hanced scrutiny without any conflicts of interest calls into question the
validity of that entire line of jurisprudence. Even if there was a con-
flict of interest, the directors satisfied the requisite factors of Unocal
and its progeny which should have resulted in the court's approval of
the board's actions.
Assuming arguendo that an enhanced scrutiny applied, the court
misapplied that standard. First, the board needed to show good faith
and a reasonable investigation into the choices for merger and their
ramifications. Both the Vice Chancellor and the Chief Justice found
that all of the NCS directors clearly manifested "the care and atten-
tion given to this project by every member of the board. ' 127 To help
insure the exercise of good faith, the board appointed an independent
committee to evaluate the merger options and provide recommenda-
tions. It appears that the board followed all of the committee's rec-
ommendations, which were determined after weighing the risks and
benefits of each company's merger offer.
Prior to Omnicare, Delaware law instructed a court to consider if a
defensive device was reasonable in relation to the threat by examining
if there were reasonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate pol-
icy existed. The review then turned to a two-tiered proportionality
test, which first considered if the actions were draconian and then con-
sidered if they were within a range of reasonableness. NCS' board
and Independent Committee had reasonable grounds to believe that
without agreeing to Genesis' terms, there would be a danger to corpo-
rate policy. Without agreeing to the defensive devices "there would
have been no Genesis deal! ' 128 To provide any relief to its Notehold-
ers and shareholders, NCS concluded that it required a merger. The
search of the market for potential acquirers, performed in good faith
while under the impending shadow of insolvency, only revealed two
viable corporations, forcing NCS into a quandary. NCS could either
face liquidation in Omnicare's offered asset sale, or a Genesis merger
providing advantageous terms but only upon acceptance of the defen-
sive devices. Thus, Genesis' offer "appeared to be the only value-en-
hancing transaction available for a company on the brink of
bankruptcy." 129 Genesis provided the only path to avoid potential liq-
uidation, which would be the ultimate danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness.
127. Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 943 (Chief Justice Veasey's dissenting opinion, quoting In re
NCS Healthcare, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2002 WL 31720732 at *15 (Del. Ch. 2002)).
128. Id. at 941.
129. Omnicare v. NCS, 818 A.2d at 940.
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NCS also had reasonable grounds for believing that Omnicare
would only agree to an asset sale because after several negotiations,
there was no indication Omnicare would discontinue its insistence on
structuring the merger through bankruptcy. The only method in
which to preserve a semblance of the current corporation and maxi-
mize shareholder value was to agree to the terms of the only other
offer. The majority does not dispute that it was reasonable to believe
Genesis would in fact walk away from the deal if NCS did not accept
the defensive terms, and the dissent agreed that based upon Omnicare
and Genesis' past relationship, it was reasonable to believe the Gene-
sis ultimatum. 130
Once NCS demonstrated that it had reasonable grounds to believe
such a danger existed, the test should have turned to the two-step pro-
portionality test. First, NCS's protective devices were neither preclu-
sive nor coercive. Preclusive methods restrict the shareholders right
to receive offers.131 In the case at bar, the shareholders retained that
right because the voting agreements, which for all practical purposes
sealed the deal, were entered into by shareholders acting as share-
holders. The fact that these shareholders were also directors does not
equate to the actions being those of directors. The agreements specifi-
cally referred to Outcalt and Shaw as shareholders. Furthermore,
Delaware cases have noted that shareholder-directors can act in their
independent shareholder capacity.132 Moreover, the Independent
Committee approved these shareholder agreements, thus providing
uninterested, outside approval of the agreements without objecting to
their characterization as shareholder agreements. Because the share-
holders entered into these agreements, and the proportionality tests
are intended to determine if the directors failed to exercise their fidu-
ciary duties by forcing the shareholders into certain results without a
say, the preclusive and coercive tests do not apply. Additionally, the
shareholder agreements indicate that the shareholders supported the
directors' actions. In fact, without the shareholder agreements, there
could never have been a complete lock-up. The defensive devices
were also not coercive because the shareholders were not forced into
acquiescing to the merger. Besides the ability to refuse to enter into
the shareholder agreements, appraisal rights were available to all
shareholders who sought release from the merger agreement. Now
130. Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 941, n94.
131. Id. at 935 (citing Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154
(Del. 1989)).
132. See, H-M Wexford, LLC v. Encorp, 832 A.2d 129 (Del.Ch. 2003); Grimes v. Donald, 1995
WL 54441 at *9 (Del.Ch. 1995).
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that it is evident that the actions were not draconian, the proportional-
ity test should examine the range of reasonableness of the defensive
devices.
To determine whether the actions taken were within a reasonable
range, the court considered several factors, including the timing, im-
pact on others, price, and the risk of non-consummation of the deal.133
All of these factors weigh in favor of NCS' decision to accept the de-
fensive devices. NCS was in a dire financial condition, and while its
stock had begun to rise, NCS was still facing hundreds of millions of
dollars of debt and insolvency. Additionally, the only other offer for
relief through a merger threatened the very existence of NCS, and
provided far less compensation to both the Noteholders and the stock-
holders. Finally, if NCS did not come to an agreement with Genesis,
NCS would either lose the best offer they had received and expected
to receive, and would then be forced to accept an exceedingly unfa-
vorable offer. A finding that NCS acted outside of a reasonable range
would force companies to choose far less attractive offers, and thus
decrease the motivation for acquiring companies to offer better terms.
ii. The Omnicare Majority Misapplied the Applicable Law
In several key aspects, the majority misapplied Delaware law and
failed to fully consider the relevant facts and circumstances. The ma-
jority noted that a conflict existed because the NCS board locked up
the merger agreement with Genesis before the shareholders were al-
lowed a final say over a potential future offer. However, the board
members' interests were aligned with the shareholders' interests, be-
cause both would benefit from a superior offer since the board mem-
bers also held shares. Furthermore, a corporation's shareholders
ultimately decide who will serve on their board, thus the board would
be motivated to obtain the highest possible shareholder value and
greatest relief of the debt in order to demonstrate to the shareholders
that the current board deserves their confidence. 134 Therefore, de-
spite the majority's contrary holding, the goals of the board were con-
sistent with those of the shareholders and Noteholders.
Additionally, if the board killed the far superior Genesis deal early
on in the negotiations for failure to agree to the defensive devices, it
may have constituted a breach of the board's fiduciary duty. Both
133. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946. 955 (Del., 1985); Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Maxmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1988).
134. Admittedly, board members are typically elected by a few majority shareholders, how-
ever, the board members' large stock holdings serves as sufficient motivation to maximize the
value of the shares.
[Vol. 3:105
DEFENSIVE DEVICES
decisions subjected the board to challenges of the manner in which it
exercised its fiduciary duty, and the board simply chose the action that
had the highest certainty for a beneficial outcome. That Omnicare
finally did present an acceptable and superior deal after the fact
should not render the board's proper exercise of its fiduciary duty ir-
relevant. "Rather, the NCS board's good faith decision must be sub-
ject to a real-time review of the board action before the NCS-Genesis
merger agreement was entered into."'1 35 Determining the validity of
an agreement based on subsequent unanticipated events will decrease
confidence in otherwise valid agreements and provide a means for a
competitor to use the courts to enforce a tardy bid that is just high
enough over the agreement entered into by businesses operating in
good faith. The majority also misinterpreted the shareholder agree-
ments as actions by the board. As discussed in part III(a)(i), the
shareholder agreements were just that, decisions individual sharehold-
ers made. The mere fact that the shareholders were also board mem-
bers does not equate to the invalidity of the shareholders' actions.
The majority also improperly applied the draconian segment of the
Unitrin proportionality test. First, the defensive devices were not en-
acted to fight off an existing hostile offer threatening the corporate
policy and effectiveness, but only to prevent NCS from losing its only
sufficient offer. 136 Second, while the board did agree to the measures,
the measures originated from another outside party. It is illogical to
state that the board coerced and precluded others, when in fact it was
Genesis who demanded these defensive terms. Unitrin discussed the
problems with draconian measures in the context of coercive and
preclusive actions "initiated by the board to delay or retard an existing
hostile bid. . .. "137 Lastly, as noted above, the board's actions could
not coerce the shareholders into action or inaction where the share-
holders had already made this a moot point by previously entering
into the shareholder agreements. 138
Perhaps the most striking misapplication of Delaware law came in
the application of the Unitrin proportionality test in evaluating the
defensive devices. The court properly spoke of the two-step test, but
once the majority determined that the defensive devices failed the
draconian segment of the test, the court automatically found that that
second part regarding the range of reasonableness failed as well sim-
135. Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 940 (Vealey, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 943-944.
137. Id. at 944 (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del.,
1995)).
138. Id. at 944-945.
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ply because the measures were held to be draconian. The majority
gave no justification for this drastic alteration of the proportionality
test. By completely ignoring the second half of the test, the majority
has indicated that this reasonableness query no longer has a place in
Delaware's analysis of defensive devices. Such a strong rejection of
precedent warrants some explanation.
Finally, the majority emphasized the lack of a fiduciary out clause,
but ignored its own previous holding in the same opinion that the
board holds a continuing fiduciary duty. The majority held that NCS
board should have included a clause that permitted them to terminate
the deal with Omnicare in order to exercise their fiduciary duty, yet
they also held that the board's fiduciary duty continued after the an-
nouncement of the Genesis merger agreement. 139 However, it seems
that a continuing fiduciary duty would make a clause, which allows the
board to exercise the fiduciary duty it already holds, redundant. An-
other indication that the board was exercising the proper duty and
properly considered any necessary future exercise of their fiduciary
duty was the negotiation of a lower penalty if NCS broke the merger
agreement. The penalty was decreased in exchange for agreeing to
the defensive devices presumably because if the board thought that a
future exercise of their duties were required, NCS should not be sub-
ject to as large of a penalty as previously suggested. Moreover, since
the shareholder agreement prevented the subsequent deal, a future
exercise of the board's fiduciary duty would not have prevented a
Genesis merger, and a fiduciary out clause would have been com-
pletely ineffective. If the board exercised its authority under such a
clause, it still would not have the power to order shareholders to
breach their agreements with Genesis. The majority characterized the
absence of a fiduciary out clause in addition to the shareholder agree-
ments as impermissible lock-up agreements. However, lock up agree-
ments are permissible in Delaware.
"A lock-up agreement is not per se illegal under Delaware law,"
and actually can maximize shareholder profit by encouraging higher
bids. 140 A Delaware Chancery case factually similar to Omnicare,
Thompson v. Enstar Corp., upheld merger lock-up agreements, con-
sisting of a voting trust agreement and by-law amendments required
by the acquirer, 141 against an action for preliminary injunction based
139. Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 936, 938.
140. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del., 1986)
citing Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578, 583 (Del. Ch., 1984). (Thompson does admit
that lock-ups deserve careful scrutiny)
141. Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578, 579 (Del. Ch. 1984).
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on an application of the business judgment rule. 142 The court empha-
sized that the board of the target company conducted an extensive
search revealing only one bona fide offer, the value of the merger of-
fer appeared to be the highest likely value at the time, and due to time
constraints of the merger transactions, the directors were forced to act
promptly to exercise their fiduciary duties.143 Furthermore, the court
held that to determine the reasonableness of the target board's ac-
tions, the current circumstances must be examined because "[t]he test
of whether the [target] board acted reasonably.. .is not whether some-
thing happened. . .which, in hindsight, may show that the direc-
tors... should have delayed [their merger agreement]. '144
The majority should have recognized that the same holds true in
Omnicare. "The adoption of the lock-up provisions was a necessary
prerequisite to [the acquirer] making its tender offer and therefore it
is probable it was reasonable for the directors to accede to [the ac-
quirer's] demand under the unusual circumstances present. '145 While
Thompson preceded both Unocal and Unitrin, and was decided in the
context of a preliminary injunction, it is clearly parallel to the facts in
Omnicare. Both cases involved an acquiring company requiring the
board of the target company to agree to defensive devices in order to
protect the bid, which provided the highest likely value for the target
company. Not only did the Thompson court find that a diligent search
and consideration of fair value was sufficient after careful scrutiny of
the defensive devices, but it also held that the reasonableness of the
board's actions should not be judged by future circumstances. The
Omnicare majority misapplied Delaware law by ignoring this case and
its holding, and by failing to consider other jurisdictions' treatment of
the issues at bar.
iii. Other Jurisdictions
While it seems that Omnicare discussed a unique combination of
the issues and facts discussed above, other jurisdictions can provide
some guidance as to where the majority went wrong. First, it is clear
that the Unitrin proportionality standard does require the court to ex-
amine whether a board's responses were reasonable in light of the
threat to corporate policy and effectiveness after the court exams the
board's actions for draconian measures. 146 Additionally, if a director
142. Id. at 581. (Thompson preceded both Unocal and Unitrin).
143. Id. at 581-582, 583.
144. Id. at 582.
145. Id. at 584.
146. See, Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 149 (Kan., 2003).
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fails to carry his initial Unocal burden, his actions are not automati-
cally invalidated, but instead the director has the burden to prove
under judicial scrutiny that he exercised fair dealing and received a
fair price under the entire fairness standard. 147 The Kansas Supreme
Court also noted, "... invoking this rigorous standard would condemn
most defensive tactics without any justification beyond the standard
itself.' 48 Ohio agrees that where a board enters into a merger agree-
ment and utilizes defensive devices, the business judgment rule will
protect the actions as long as fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion
does not arise; ("lock-ups in a takeover situation are not, per se, ultra
vires.)"'149 As in Delaware, Ohio states that the failure to exercise due
care after reasonable investigation or acting to satisfy a director's own
interests instead of the corporation or shareholders', also may serve as
grounds for the lock-ups to be deemed unlawful. 150
Regarding a potential conflict of interest, Maryland supports the
notion that NCS' directors were not acting under a conflict of interest
even if they were offered board positions in the new company.1 51 Fi-
nally, Missouri law indicates that where a board considers merger of-
fers, they need not take the highest offer; they "must simply accept
the best alternative for shareholders, all things considered."'1 52 Simi-
larly, Michigan holds that under the review of enhanced judicial scru-
tiny, the board's decision need only be reasonable, not perfect, and
the court should not second-guess a choice among merger alternatives
based on subsequent events.' 53
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF OMNICARE
a. The Majority's Decision May Be Somewhat Tolerable
While appearing repugnant to logic and Delaware law, the major-
ity's holding may be tolerable in light of a narrow application and the
147. Id. (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 (Del., 1995)).
148. Id. at 148 (quoting, Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Stan-
dard for Defensive Tactics: Is there Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. Law. 247
(1989)) (This quoted passage also remarks that management is typically insulated by the business
judgment rule from such a defensive response to a takeover bid as long as a hostile takeover is
not involved which may cause a conflict of interest.)
149. Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d 1072, 1077 (1990), (citing Cottle v. Storer Communication,
Inc., 849 F.2d 570,574 (11th Cir. 1988)).
150. Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1077.
151. Wittman v. Crooke, 707 A.2d 422, 425 (Md.App. 1998). (The court stated that employ-
ment offers do not constitute problematic conflicts of interest, especially if the transactions are
disclosed to the shareholders prior to their ratification). Id.
152. Flake v. Hoskins, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1214 (D. Kan., 1999).
153. Simon Property Group, Inc. v. Taubman Centers, Inc., No. 02-74799, 2003 US Dist.
LEXIS 7435 at *52 (E.D. Mich., 2003).
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recent trend away from deference to corporate management. As
noted by both the majority and dissent, the facts of this case are fairly
unique. It seems unlikely that the exact combination of insolvency,
friendly merger, previous bad blood between the competing acquirers,
number of provisions required to be accepted by shareholders and di-
rectors of the target corporation in a short period, and the subsequent
higher offer by the former losing party found in the instant action will
occur again. If the courts apply Omnicare to situations in which all of
these circumstances are replicated, it is unlikely that Omnicare will
often appear again.
The June 2003 issue of the M & A Lawyer suggests a number of
methods courts may narrowly interpret and apply Omnicare.154 First,
Neimeth and Reese suggest that if a Section 251(c) covenant, requir-
ing the board to submit merger proposals to the shareholders for a
vote, is not included in a merger agreement, or included with a share-
holder agreement that does not lockup a majority of the vote, a differ-
ent result may occur. 155 Second, these mergers and acquisitions
attorneys suggest that in exchange for agreeing to the acquiring com-
pany's defensive devices, the acquirer agrees to "fully fund[ a ]cash
tender or registered exchange offer to cash (or swap) out the public
minority" within a predetermined time of exercising the defensive de-
vices. 156 Another offered alternative is to structure the "deal as a uni-
lateral tender offer with a majority stockholder tender
commitment.. .without a board approved merger agreement implicat-
ing the director approval and stockholder adoption requirements.'
1 57
Among other suggestions, the article also notes that providing the spe-
cial committee with complete authority to act on a deal could also
possibly provide different results.158
If future cases arise in which the directors do not provide as com-
plete of a record of the numerous actions and considerations taken to
render independent decisions, Omnicare may have some viability in
analyzing defensive devices used carelessly without the appropriate
weighing of the costs and benefits of each possible choice. Addition-
ally, the decision may seem slightly less objectionable in view of the
corporate controversies such as Enron and WorldCom of the past few
years. These controversies have affected the reactions to corporate
154. Clifford E. Neimeth & Cathy L. Reese, Locked and Loaded: Delaware Supreme Court
Takes Aim at Deal Certainty, 7 No. 2 M & A LAW. 16 (2003).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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governance in both the public and judicial eye. Delaware Chief Jus-
tice Veasey remarked in January, 2003 that "a new set of expectations
for directors [is] changing how the courts looks at these issues" and
Delaware Vice Chancellor Strine stated "there's increasing pressure
on the courts to look at the subject of independent directors.' 5 9 In
fact, the Omnicare decision followed four similar Delaware Supreme
Court rulings which all reversed the lower court in favor of the share-
holders.1 60 After the recent corporate management controversies, the
public and courts seem to be willing to accept more judicial intrusion
upon the decision making of corporate directors and officers.
Finally, "[g]iven the unique facts of Omnicare, the powerful dis-
sents, and the recent retirement of one of the majority justices, the full
impact of the decision may need to await further judicial develop-
ments. In the meantime, the decision suggests that practitioners
should approach very cautiously... deal protection measures. ' ' 161
b. Impact of the Decision
The majority's decision appears to have a number of negative ef-
fects on corporate transactions throughout the country. More compa-
nies are incorporated in Delaware than any other state, so the odds
are exceedingly high that one of several companies involved in a
merger will be incorporated in Delaware and require Delaware law to
apply to their transaction. Additionally, most states look towards
Delaware's corporate law decisions for guidance in their own hold-
ings, so when a corporate decision making significant changes in previ-
ous jurisprudence is handed down by Delaware's highest court,
companies (and law firms) across the nation will listen and likely
react.
Furthermore, other negative outcomes may result from Omnicare.
The decision may cause potential bidders to offer lower prices, espe-
cially early in the negotiations for fear that higher offers cannot (or
will not) be protected with any guarantee, and simply be used as a
stalking horse to seek higher bidders to subsequently enter negotia-
159. Tamara Loomis, Beware Delaware, The State's Recent Supreme Court Decisions Make
Waves, 229 NEW YORK L. J. 5 (2003) (quoting Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine at a corpo-
rate governance conference and quoting Delaware Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey).
160. Id. (citing Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257 (Del., 2002); Saito v. McKesson
HBOC Inc., 806 A.2d 113 (Del., 2002); Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
803 A.2d 248 (Del., 2002); MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del., 2003)).
161. ABA Subcommittee on Recent Judicial Developments, Negotiated Acquisitions Com-
mittee, Annual Survey of Judicial Developments Pertaining to Mergers and Acquisitions, 58 Bus.
LAW. 1521 (2003).
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tions.' 62 "There are real life cases in which bidders turn away because
they didn't get lockup protection. .. It's a classic case of bad facts
making bad law." 163 It is reasonable to imagine other situations in
which a bidding company has invested large amounts of money into
acquiring a company and would like some concrete assurance that
their good faith efforts are not completely in vain.
Just as early, high offers may be discouraged, the decision may en-
courage other bidders to wait out the negotiations of other parties and
offer a slightly higher offer at the last possible moment. If the target
corporation does not consider and possibly accept this twenty-fifth
hour offer, despite other relevant factors outside of the higher price
and contractual guarantees between the original negotiating parties,
the target company exposes itself to significant litigation which it now
has a high probability of losing. Omnicare's trend away from consid-
ering all relevant factors of a bidder, besides the size of their wallet,
may also result in more target companies losing their identity and en-
tering bankruptcy or an asset sale. The dangers of ignoring the rele-
vant circumstances surrounding a bidder's offer are also abundant. It
would seem advisable to encourage the corporate decision makers to
evaluate more than just the highest price they may receive where they
are deciding which companies will provide the highest likelihood of
success. The decision suggests "that a board's decision (however rea-
sonable when made) is subject to post-hoc judicial rejection based on
a superseding and unforeseen post-signing event." 164 Thus, the hold-
ing makes a board's decision-making process either not very relevant,
or wholly irrelevant, based upon whether a somewhat improved "deal
later comes along-even if that deal was not reasonably foreseeable at
the time of the directors' initial decision.
165
Bankruptcy may often be the best solution for companies facing in-
solvency. However, until this holding, more options outside of bank-
ruptcy existed for a board of directors to pursue in order to maintain
some vestiges of the former company and return it to a financially
viable position. All of the newly added uncertainty and lack of con-
trol over some of the most important events in a corporation's life
may cause more and more companies to simply avoid friendly mergers
altogether and resign to enter bankruptcy or wait for a hostile take-
over which they can only hope provides the financial relief a negoti-
ated merger would have provided pre-Omnicare.
162. See Loomis, supra note 159 at 5.
163. Id. (quoting Robert Profusek, a partner at Jones Day in New York).
164. Neimeth & Reese, supra note 154 at.
165. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The majority's holding in Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare was im-
proper due to the failure to properly apply the facts and circumstances
to the appropriate Delaware law and fully consider the ramifications
of the holding. As it stands, the holding negatively impacts the free
negotiation of parties wishing to effectuate a friendly merger, and calls
into question the proper law across the United States for examining
defensive devices. One can only hope that future courts treat this de-
cision with the narrowest of application and correct its mistakes so
that corporations may regain the proper level of confidence in busi-
ness transactions when looking to Delaware for guidance in their
actions.
